We revisit the classical decision-theoretic problem of weighted expert voting from a statistical learning perspective. In particular, we examine the consistency (both asymptotic and finitary) of the optimal NitzanParoush weighted majority and related rules. In the case of known expert competence levels, we give sharp error estimates for the optimal rule. When the competence levels are unknown, they must be empirically estimated. We provide frequentist and Bayesian analyses for this situation. Some of our proof techniques are non-standard and may be of independent interest. The bounds we derive are nearly optimal, and several challenging open problems are posed. Experimental results are provided to illustrate the theory.
Introduction
The problem of weighting the input of several experts arises in many situations and is of considerable theoretical and practical importance. The rigorous study of majority vote has its roots in the work of Condorcet (1785) . By the 70s, the field of decision theory was actively exploring various voting rules (see Nitzan & Paroush (1982) and the references therein). A typical setting is as follows. An agent is tasked with predicting some random variable Y ∈ {±1} based on input X i ∈ {±1} from each of n experts. Each expert X i has a competence level p i ∈ (0, 1), which is the probability of making a correct prediction: P(X i = Y ) = p i . Two simplifying assumptions are commonly made:
(i) Independence: The random variables {X i : i ∈ [n]} are mutually independent.
(ii) Unbiased truth: P(Y = +1) = P(Y = −1) = 1/2.
We will discuss these assumptions below in greater detail; for now, let us just take them as given. (Since the bias of Y can be easily estimated from data, only the independence assumption is truly restrictive.) A decision rule is a mapping f : {±1} n → {±1} from the n expert inputs to the agent's final decision. Our quantity of interest throughout the paper will be the agent's probability of error, P(f (X) = Y ).
(
A decision rule f is optimal if it minimizes the quantity in (1) over all possible decision rules. Nitzan & Paroush (1982) showed that, when Assumptions (i)-(ii) hold and the true competences p i are known, the optimal decision rule is obtained by an appropriately weighted majority vote:
where the weights w i are given by
Thus, w i is the log-odds of expert i being correct -and the voting rule in (2), also known as naive Bayes (Hastie et al., 2009) , may be seen as a simple consequence of the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Neyman & Pearson, 1933) .
Main results. The formula in (2) raises immediate questions, which apparently have not previously been addressed. The first one has to do with the consistency of the Nitzan-Paroush optimal rule: under what conditions does the probability of error decay to zero and at what rate? In Section 3, we show that the probability of error is controlled by the committee potential Φ, defined by
More precisely, we prove in Theorem 1 that
where ≍ denotes equivalence up to universal multiplicative constants. Another issue not addressed by the Nitzan-Paroush result is how to handle the case where the competences p i are not known exactly but rather estimated empirically bŷ p i . We present two solutions to this problem: a frequentist and a Bayesian one. As we show in Section 4, the frequentist approach does not admit an optimal empirical decision rule. Instead, we analyze empirical decision rules in various settings: high-confidence (i.e., |p i − p i | ≪ 1) vs. low-confidence, adaptive vs. nonadaptive. The low-confidence regime requires no additional assumptions, but provides weaker guarantees (Theorem 5). In the high-confidence regime, the adaptive approach provides error estimates in terms of the empiricalp i s (Theorem 10), while the nonadaptive approach gives a bound in terms of the unknown p i s, but still gives useful asymptotics (Theorem 9). The Bayesian solution sidesteps the various cases above, as it admits a simple, provably optimal empirical decision rule (Section 5). Unfortunately, we are unable to compute (or even nontrivially estimate) the probability of error induced by this rule; this is posed as a challenging open problem.
Background and related work
Machine learning theory typically clusters weighted majority (Littlestone & Warmuth, 1989 , 1994 within the framework of online algorithms; see Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi (2006) for a modern treatment. Since the online setting is considerably more adversarial than ours, we obtain very different weighted majority rules and consistency guarantees. The weights w i in (2) bear a striking similarity to the Adaboost update rule (Freund & Schapire, 1997; Schapire & Freund, 2012) . However, the latter assumes weak learners with access to labeled examples, while in our setting the experts are "static". Still, we do not rule out a possible deeper connection between the Nitzan-Paroush decision rule and boosting. In a recent line of work Lacasse et al. (2006) ; Laviolette & Marchand (2007) ; Roy et al. (2011) have developed a PAC-Bayesian theory for the majority vote of simple classifiers. This approach facilitates data-dependent bounds and is even flexible enough to capture some simple dependencies among the classifiersthough, again, the latter are learners as opposed to our experts. Even more recently, experts with adversarial noise have been considered (Mansour et al., 2013) . More directly related to the present work are the papers of Berend & Paroush (1998) , which characterizes the consistency of the simple majority rule, and Boland et al. (1989) ; Berend & Sapir (2007) which analyze various models of dependence among the experts.
Known competences
In this section we assume that the expert competences p i are known and analyze the consistency of the Nitzan-Paroush optimal decision rule (2). Our main result here is that the probability of error P(f OPT (X) = Y ) is small if and only if the committee potential Φ is large. Theorem 1. Suppose that the experts X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) satisfy Assumptions (i)-(ii) and f : {±1} n → {±1} is the Nitzan-Paroush optimal decision rule. Then
Open problem. Exhibit (if possible) a function g : R → R such that
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1(i)
Define the {0, 1}-indicator variables
corresponding to the event that the i th expert is correct. A mistake f OPT (X) = Y occurs precisely when 1 the sum of the correct experts' weights fails to exceed half the total mass:
Since Eξ i = p i , we may rewrite the probability in (6) as
A standard tool for estimating such sum deviation probabilities is Hoeffding's inequality. Applied to (7), it yields the bound
which is far too crude for our purposes. Indeed, consider a finite committee of highly competent experts with p i 's arbitrarily close to 1 and X 1 the most competent of all. Raising X 1 's competence sufficiently far above his peers will cause both the numerator and the denominator in the exponent to be dominated by w 2 1 , making the right-hand-side of (8) bounded away from zero. The inability of Hoeffding's inequality to guarantee consistency even in such a felicitous setting is an instance of its generally poor applicability to highly heterogeneous sums, a phenomenon explored in some depth in McAllester & Ortiz (2003) . Bernstein's and Bennett's inequalities suffer from a similar weakness (see ibid.). Fortunately, an inequality of Kearns & Saul (1998) is sufficiently sharp to yield the desired estimate: For all p ∈ [0, 1] and all t ∈ R,
Remark 1. The Kearns-Saul inequality (9) may be seen as a distributiondependent refinement of Hoeffding's (which bounds the left-hand-side of (9) by e t 2 /8 ), and is not nearly as straightforward to prove. An elementary rigorous proof is given in Berend & Kontorovich (2013b) . Following up, Raginsky & Sason (2013) gave a "soft" proof based on transportation and information-theoretic techniques. (6), and apply Markov's inequality:
1 Without loss of generality, ties are considered to be errors.
where the inequality follows from (9). By independence,
and hence
Choosing t = 1 yields the bound in Theorem 1(i).
Proof of Theorem 1(ii)
Define the {±1}-indicator variables
corresponding to the event that the i th expert is correct and put q i = 1 − p i . The shorthand w · η = n i=1 w i η i will be convenient. We will need some simple lemmata:
where
Proof. The identities (5), (6) and (12) imply that a mistake occurs precisely when
which is equivalent to
Exponentiating both sides,
We conclude from (14) that among two "antipodal" atoms ±η ∈ {±1} n , the one with the greater mass contributes to the probability being correct and the one with the smaller mass contributes to the probability of error, which proves the claim.
Remark 2. The proof of Lemma 2 also establishes the optimality of the NitzanParoush decision rule.
Proof. Immediate from
Lemma 4. Define the function F : (0, 1) → R by
Then sup 0<x<1 F (x) = 1 2 . Proof. Deferred to the Appendix.
Continuing with the main proof, observe that
and
By Lemma 4,
Define the segment I ⊂ R by
Chebyshev's inequality together with (15) and (16) implies that
Consider an atom η ∈ {±1} n for which w · η ∈ I. The proof of Lemma 2 shows that
where the inequality follows from (17). Lemma 2 further implies that
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3, (18) and (19). This completes the proof.
Unknown competences: frequentist approach
Our goal in this section is to obtain, insofar as possible, analogues of Theorem 1 for unknown expert competences. When the p i s are unknown, they must be estimated empirically before any useful weighted majority vote can be applied. There are various ways to model partial knowledge of expert competences (Baharad et al., 2011 (Baharad et al., , 2012 . Perhaps the simplest scenario for estimating the p i s is to assume that the i th expert has been queried independently m i times, out of which he gave the correct prediction k i times. Taking the {m i } to be fixed, define the committee profile by k = (k 1 , . . . , k n ); this is the aggregate of the agent's empirical knowledge of the experts' performance. An empirical decision rulef : (x, k) → {±1} makes a final decision based on the expert inputs x together with the committee profile. Analogously to (1), the probability of a mistake is
Note that now the committee profile is an additional source of randomness. Here we run into our first difficulty: unlike the probability in (1), which is minimized by the Nitzan-Paroush rule, the agent cannot formulate an optimal decision rulef in advance without knowing the p i s. This is because no decision rule is optimal uniformly over the range of possible p i s. Our approach will be to consider weighted majority decision rules of the form
and to analyze their consistency properties under two different regimes: lowconfidence and high-confidence. These refer to the confidence intervals of the frequentist estimate of p i , given bŷ
Low-confidence regime
In the low-confidence regime, the sample sizes m i may be as small as 1, and we define
which induces the empirical decision rulef LC . It remains to analyzef LC 's probability of error. Recall the definition of ξ i from (5) and observe that
2 For m i min {p i , q i } ≪ 1, the estimated competencesp i may well take values in {0, 1}, in which case log(p i /q i ) = ±∞. The rule in (23) is essentially a first-order Taylor approximation to w(·) about p = 1 2 . sincep i and ξ i are independent. As in (6), the probability of error (20) 
2 ). Now the {Z i } are independent random variables,
2 (by (24)), and each Z i takes values in an interval of length 1 2 . Hence, the standard Hoeffding bound applies:
We summarize these calculations in
Several remarks are in order. First, notice that the error bound in (26) is stated in terms of the unknown {p i }, providing the agent with large-committee asymptotics but giving no finitary information; this limitation is inherent in the low-confidence regime. Secondly, the condition in Theorem 5 is considerably more restrictive than the consistency condition Φ → ∞ implicit in Theorem 1. Indeed, the empirical decision rulef LC is incapable of exploiting a single highly competent expert in the way that f OPT from (2) does. Our analysis could be sharpened somewhat for moderate sample sizes {m i } by using Bernstein's inequality to take advantage of the low variance of thep i s. For sufficiently large sample sizes, however, the high-confidence regime (discussed below) begins to take over. Finally, there is one sense in which this case is "easier" to analyze than that of known {p i }: since the summands in (25) are bounded, Hoeffding's inequality gives nontrivial results and there is no need for more advanced tools such as the Kearns-Saul inequality (9) (which is actually inapplicable in this case).
High-confidence regime
In the high-confidence regime, each estimated competencep i is close to the true value p i with high probability. To formalize this, fix some 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ε ≤ 5, and put
We will set the empirical weights according to the "plug-in" Nitzan-Paroush ruleŵ
which induces the empirical decision rulef HC and raises immediate concerns aboutŵ HC i = ±∞. We give two kinds of bounds on P(f HC = Y ): nonadaptive and adaptive. In the nonadaptive analysis, we show that for m i min {p i , q i } i ≫ 1, with high probability |w i −ŵ HC i | ≪ 1, and thus a "perturbed" version of Theorem 1(i) holds (and in particular, w HC i will be finite with high probability). In the adaptive analysis, we allowŵ HC i to take on infinite values 3 and show (perhaps surprisingly) that this decision rule also asymptotically achieves the rate of Theorem 1(i).
Nonadaptive analysis. Defineε ∈ (0, 1) by ε = 2ε + 4ε 2 or, explicitly,
Lemma 6. Ifε
Proof. The multiplicative Chernoff bound yields
Hence,
The claim follows from (29) and the union bound.
Lemma 7. Let w i be the optimal Nitzan-Paroush weight (3). If
Proof. We have
Corollary 8. Ifε
Proof. An immediate consequence of applying Lemma 6 to p i and q i with the union bound.
To state the next result, let us arrange the plug-in weights (27) as a vector w HC ∈ R n , as was done with w and η from Section 3.1. The corresponding weighted majority rulef HC yields an error precisely when
(cf. (13)). Our nonadaptive approach culminates in the following result.
Theorem 9. Let 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < ε < min {5, 2Φ/n}. If
Remark 3. For fixed {p i } and min i∈[n] m i → ∞, we may take δ and ε arbitrarily small -and in this limiting case, the bound of Theorem 1(i) is recovered.
Proof of Theorem 9. Since
we have
Corollary 8 upper-bounds the first term on the right-hand side by δ. The second term is estimated by replacing Φ by Φ − εn in (10) and repeating the argument following that formula.
Adaptive analysis. Theorem 9 has the drawback of being nonadaptive, in that its assumptions (30) and conclusions (31) depend on the unknown {p i } and hence cannot be evaluated by the agent (the bound in (26) is also nonadaptive).
In the adaptive approach, all results are stated in terms of empirically observed quantities:
and let R be the event
Then
Remark 4. Our interpretation for Theorem 10 is as follows. The agent observes the committee profile K, which determines the {p i ,ŵ HC i }, and then checks whether the event R has occurred. If not, the adaptive agent refrains from making a decision (and may choose to fall back on the low-confidence approach described previously). If R does hold, however, the agent predicts Y according tô f HC . As explained above, there does not exist a nontrivial a priori upper bound on P(f HC (X, K) = Y ) absent any knowledge of the p i s. Instead, Theorem 10 bounds the probability of the agent being "fooled" by an unrepresentative committee profile. Proof. We will write the probability and expectation operators with subscripts (such as K) to indicate the random variable(s) being summed over. Thus,
Recall that the random variable η ∈ {±1} n , with probability mass function
is independent of K, and hence
Define the random variableη ∈ {±1} n (conditioned on K) by the probability mass function
and the set A ⊆ {±1} n by A = {x :ŵ HC · x ≤ 0} . Now
where the inequality follows from a standard tensorization property of the total variation norm · TV , see e.g. (Kontorovich, 2012, Lemma 2.2) . By Theorem 1(i), we have
Invoking (34), we substitute the right-hand side above into (33) to obtain
By the definition of R, the second term on the last right-hand side is upperbounded by δ/2. To estimate M , we invoke a simple mean absolute deviation bound (cf. Berend & Kontorovich (2013a) ):
which finishes the proof.
Remark 5. The improvement mentioned in Footnote 5 is achieved via a refinement of the bound
, where α(·) is the function defined in Kontorovich (2012, Lemma 4 .2).
Open problem. As argued in Remark 4, Theorem 10 achieves the optimal asymptotic rate in {p i }. Can the dependence on {m i } be improved, perhaps through a better choice ofŵ HC ?
Unknown competences: Bayesian approach
A shortcoming of Theorem 10 is that when condition R fails, the agent is left with no estimate of the error probability. An alternative (and in some sense cleaner) approach to handling unknown expert competences p i is to assume a known prior distribution over the competence levels p i . The natural choice of prior for a Bernoulli parameter is the Beta distribution, namely
with density
where q i = 1 − p i and B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)/Γ(x + y). Our full probabilistic model is as follows. Each of the n expert competences p i is drawn independently from a Beta distribution with known parameters α i , β i . Then the i th expert, i ∈ [n], is queried independently m i times, with k i correct predictions and m i − k i incorrect ones. As before, K = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) is the (random) committee profile. Absent direct knowledge of the p i s, the agent relies on an empirical decision rulef : (x, k) → {±1} to produce a final decision based on the expert inputs x together with the committee profile k. A decision rulef
Ba is Bayes-optimal if it minimizes
which is formally identical to (20) but semantically there is a difference: the probability in (35) is over the p i in addition to (X, Y, K). Unlike the frequentist approach, where no optimal empirical decision rule was possible, the Bayesian approach readily admits one. For a given x ∈ {±1}, define I + (x) to be the set of YES votes
and I − (x) = [n] \ I + (x) to be the set of NO votes. Let us fix some A ⊆ [n], B = [n] \ A and compute
Analogously,
Let us use the shorthand P (+1, A, B) and P (−1, A, B) for the joint probabilities in the last two displays, along with their corresponding conditionals P (±1 | A, B). Obviously,
which occurs precisely if
Low vs. high confidence.
The goal of this experiment was to contrast the extremal behavior off LC vs.f HC . To this end, we numerically optimized the p ∈ [0, 1] n so as to maximize the absolute gap
2 )x i . We were surprised to discover that, though the ratio P(f LC (X) = Y )/P(f OPT (X) = Y ) can be made arbitrarily large by setting p 1 ≈ 1 and the remaining p i < 1 − ε, the absolute gap appears to be rather small: we conjecture (with some heuristic justification) that sup n≥1 sup p∈[0,1] n ∆ n (p) = 1/16. Forf Ba , we used α i = β i = 1 for all i. The results are reported in Figure 1 . Ba uniformly outperforms the other two empirical rules. We found it somewhat surprising thatf HC required so many samples (about 60 on average) to overtakef LC . The simple majority rule f MAJ (off the chart) performed at an average accuracy of 50%, as expected.
Discussion
The classic and seemingly well-understood problem of the consistency of weighted majority votes continues to reveal untapped depth and suggest challenging unresolved questions. We hope that the results and open problems presented here will stimulate future research.
The denominator is obviously nonnegative on [ 
